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Cultures of conflict: Protests, violent repression,
and community values
Birol Akkus1,2* , Tom Postmes1 , Katherine Stroebe1 and
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1University of Groningen, The Netherlands
2Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Enschede, The Netherlands
3Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
What are the cultural origins of societal conflicts that revolve around democratization,
women’s rights, andmodern libertarian values?We propose that deep-seated differences
in community-based collective values (at the micro-level) may be related to why people
support anti-government protest and why they support repression of such protests (at
the macro-level). The hypothesis was examined among residents of Turkey (N = 500).
Cultural values, measured at the individual level and community level with the community
collectivism scale, correlated with political orientation and emotions, as well as with
subsequent support for anti-governmental protest or its repression. The main
conclusions are that both support for protest and support for repression are related
to the cultural values people hold and their subsequent political orientations and
emotions. Micro-level cultural values in local communities may thus play a role in
explaining macro-level socio-political divides.
Since around 2010, many countries in the world have experienced a sharp increase in
major nationwide protests (Banks & Wilson, 2016). The Arab Spring, mass protests in
India against sexual violence, thewomen’smarch in theUnited States triggered byDonald
Trump’s policies and statements, and the Gezi protests in Turkey are examples of a subset
of these protests that primarily seem to revolve around democratization, women’s rights,
and modern libertarian values. The present study’s starting point is the observation that
protests often coincide with deep-seated societal divides (Kriesi, 2010) which may
revolve around cultural values.We take this one step further byproposing that the cultural
values associated with social and political conflicts stem from local communities and that
they are potent influences because they perform an important function in within-
community group dynamics. The present study therefore focuses on values of
individualism and collectivism in relation to one’s proximate community (so, at the
micro-level) and examines to what extent these values are related to societal protest
against a conservative government and to the violent repression of those progressive
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protests (at the macro-level). The question is whether micro-level cultural values are
related to macro-level political support.
We study this by focusing not just on support for protests, but also on support for the
(violent) repression of these protests. Traditionally, studies of protest and movements
focus on disadvantaged groups in intergroup settings (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Only few studies (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, &
Heath, 2011; Milesi & Alberici, 2018; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2019) have
focused onwhat might motivate support for activism on both sides of a political protest –
both in support of progressive or libertarian principles (in the current study: protests that
challenge the status quo) and in support of authoritarian or conservative principles (in the
present study: the repression of those protests). In the present study, we focus on what
we conceptualize are proximate determinants of such support (political orientations,
emotions) as well as more distal predictors (community-based values of individualism and
collectivism). We thus focus on cultural divisionswithin society that, we assume, may be
related to proximal predictors. We examine these processes in Turkey where we expect
such community-based values to be associated with large-scale clashes. The specific
protest, the so-called Gezi protest, as well as the context of Turkey, we believe makes an
interesting case study of a within-society conflict with cultural origins.
Distal determinants of conflict: clashing cultural values
In studies of political conflict and collective action, culture has often been identified as a
relevant factor. For example, cultural characteristics can sometimes enhance the
likelihood of intercultural conflicts, by encouraging intercultural misunderstandings
(Triandis, 2000; Williams, 2004). Moreover, speaking to the relevance of studying
‘culture’ in relation to collective action (Van Zomeren & Louis, 2017), cross-national
differences have been shown to affect the relation between determinants of collective
action and collective action itself (Stewart et al., 2016), as well as beliefs about social
change (Bain, Kroonenberg, &Kashima, 2015). These perspectives implicitly build on the
assumption that cultures are broadly shared within a society and not themselves
contested. However, in the current studywe take the perspective that cultural valuesmay
also become a sourceof disagreementwithin a society: Thequestion ofwhich culture is or
should be dominant may itself be the subject of political contestation (see also Jasper,
2017). Indeed, various societal tensions currently witnessed across the globe (e.g., Brazil,
Iran, Turkey, perhaps also the United States) can be explained as intra-societal conflicts
over basic cultural values: women’s rights, democracy, and self-determination. This is
indirectly confirmed by research that shows that liberal voting tends to coincide with
cultural values such as universalism, benevolence, and self-direction, whereas conserva-
tive voting is associated with more conservative cultural values of security, power,
achievement, tradition, and conformity (Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli,
2008). Therefore, there is reason to believe that differences in cultural values may have
political consequences.
Assessing within-country cultural variation
It is widely accepted that culture can be considered the template for socialization for
(new) members of a society (Schwartz & Ros, 1995) and as such serves to instil a shared
understanding of how a society works and should work. There is, however, debate about
at what level such common understanding is shared.
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Many existingmeasures and conceptualizations of cultural values such as individualism
versus collectivism (Minkov &Hofstede, 2012), tightness versus looseness (Gelfand et al.,
2011), or basic human values (Schwartz, 1999) are measures of individually held values.
With respect to examining the differences between cultural groups, these measures have
one shortcoming: One can only make inferences about the group by aggregating across
individual-level measures (cf. McCrae et al., 2013), which conceptually seems at odds
with the commonly accepted definition of culture as shared meaning system (Fischer,
2012). When examining within-culture differences (which is particularly important in
heterogeneous societies), this problem is compounded by not knowing what particular
community or subcultural group an individual’s responses should be attributed to.
A recent approach attempts to solve this problem by focusing on the intersubjectivity
of values (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), suggesting that people
attach special importance to cultural values that they perceive to bewidely shared within
their cultural group. In most implementations thus far, researchers have tended to
measure what individuals perceive to be the cultural values held by the majority of ‘their
country’ or ‘their culture’. This approach is well suited to examining between-national or
between-cultural differences in intersubjective values; however, it is less well suited to
examining within-nation differences, such as the clashing cultural values between
subcultural groups or communities that the present study is focused on.
Community collectivism
Extending the intersubjective methodology, (Akkus, Postmes, & Stroebe, 2017) recently
developed the concept of community collectivism. The core idea is that some cultural
values serve thepurpose of regulating social interactionswithin communities suchas one’s
(extended) family.1 These tend to be tight-knit communities in the sense that members are
connected by strong ties such as family bonds and they tend to be relatively close
proximity, characterized by frequent contact and longevity (e.g., networks of close kin, cf.
Bian, 1997). Within such tight-knit communities, we propose there are values that serve
the purpose of keeping the group’s structure intact andmanaging intra-group interactions.
These values help the community to achieve clarity about expectations, obligations,
group interactions, and transactions. These core values perform four functions that keep
the group tight-knit: (1) provide loyalty and support, so bonds remain strong; (2) divide
labour and responsibilities, so group members know their roles and position; (3) enforce
norms and expectations, so group members knowwhat is honourable and shameful; and
(4) encourage agency and autonomy, so group members know when to act and think for
themselves (see also Postmes, Akkus, & Stroebe, 2015). Accordingly, the central
collectivist values should be concernedwith loyalty and support, hierarchy and structure,
and honour and norm enforcement. Individualist values are concerned with agency and
autonomy. Intersubjective agreement about these community-based values benefits
group efficiency and keeps social relations intact: They inform every member of the
community about who they are and about how to act in relation to others.
This concept of community collectivism has implications for how values of collectivism
and individualism should be measured. These values are held by individuals, but they
originate from the community and are normative. In line with this concept of community
1 Community is defined in the community collectivism scale as: ‘your core family, your extended family and other families (in your
environment) that matter to you’.
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collectivism, a 30-item community collectivism scalewas recently developed and validated
(CCS, Akkus et al., 2017). The CCSmeasures collectivist and individualist values held at the
personal level andperceived toexistwithin one’s self-relevant community (i.e., one’s family
and the immediate social network around it). In order to measure community values, for
example, the scale assesses perceptions of common social practices within one’s
community (e.g., ‘In my community, members of the family feel responsible for preserving
and protecting another family member’s honor’). The assumption is that individual values
are grounded in the values of one’s community. Akkus et al. (2017) validated the scale and
showed that it distinguishes betweenpersonal collectivism and community collectivism, as
well as between personal agency and community agency.
Prior research has shown that CCS explains behavioural intentions and attitudes
within the community (e.g.,whether one should care for the elders in one’s family, or how
people of different genders should behave, Akkus et al., 2017). Relevant for the present
study is that Akkus et al. (2017) also showed that CCS predicted voting behaviour: Higher
scores on collectivism were strongly related to voting for a conservative party.2 In the
current research, we study whether values of community collectivism can also be related
to support for collective action against a conservative government and in favour of it. We
thus propose that values originating from local tight-knit communities may play a role in
the broader political context of society. In particular, the varying degrees to which
communities promote collectivist values of honour and hierarchy and the subsequent
subcultural differences can become intimately connected with national-level politics. As
Jasper (2017, p. 298) puts it: ‘Small groups are precisely the kind of interactive context
that creates understandings, in which decisions are made and actions initiated, where
emotions are generated and displayed, with impacts on others [. . .] They are the kind of
local setting where politics unfolds’. While we believe that this connection between
community values and political movements is relevant in multiple societies today, we do
not know of any research that has addressed this specific point. What is interesting and
novel about this approach, we believe, is that it implies that macro-level political conflict
may ultimately stem from the desire to preserve and protect local communities.
Support for activism and repression in conflict situations: proximal determinants
What are relevant proximate predictors of support for anti-government protest and for
government oppression? Given the constraints of conducting a short survey, we decided
to focus on two key predictors that should, according to prior research, account for a
considerable amount of variance: political orientation and negative emotional reactions
(including moral condemnation of the outgroup).
In general, people’s political orientation is the strongest predictor of whether they
support a government policy or not (Lau&Heldman, 2009; Sears, Lau, Tyler, &Allen, 1980).
In situations of a ‘hot’ conflict between government and its opponents, it makes sense that
this effect of political orientation is also strong, if not stronger: Intergroup conflict tends to
accentuate ingroup favouritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and so in a conflict situation those
who take the government’s side should, if anything, support the governingparty’s actions to
suppress a protest evenmore (Brewer, 2001). This reasoning can be extended to predictors
of support for protests against the government. A large literature shows that commitment to
activism is predicted by identificationwith the activist cause (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). By
2 It is important to note that this finding was a follow-up study in which the sample used in the present study was resampled.
52 Birol Akkus et al.
extension, defining oneself as a government opponent should coincide with support for
government opposition. In the current study, since we are dealing with protest against a
conservative government, we reason that this protest would be supported by those who
categorize themselves as liberals (or progressives), while government repression would be
endorsed by those who self-categorize as conservatives.
In addition, we were interested in the role of moral emotions in support of protests or
its repression. One reason for this is research showing that, particularly in conflict
situations and particularly among those who are ideologically involved, collective
emotions may run high and may play a role in motivating (support for) action (Mackie,
Devos, & Smith, 2000; Sternberg, 2005; Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, 2015).
Research on collective action andmobilization has often focused on injustice-based anger
– a prime motivator for disadvantaged groups. But for high status groups who support
suppression feelings of entitlement and superiority may also play a role (cf. Postmes &
Smith, 2009). Accordingly, we decided not to focus solely on specific emotions involved
in politicized conflicts such as anger (Tausch et al., 2011) or hatred (Bar-Tal, Halperin, &
de Rivera, 2007), but on a range of emotions, including the overarching moral
condemnation of the outgroup that is common to both feelings of injustice-based anger
(cf. Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012) as well as superiority-
based emotions (Postmes & Smith, 2009).
The present research
Research context
The current study took place against the background of the Turkish protests of 2013 and
its backlash. Amid increasing tensions between the conservative government and people
with a more secularist outlook, a small and peaceful protest took place in Gezi Park,
Istanbul. This escalated into unprecedented nationwide protests, initially against police
brutality but later against the government’s socially conservative politics. This develop-
ment splits the country into supporters and opponents of the government (the
conservative AKP of then Prime Minister Erdogan). Opponents of the government
accused it of authoritarian leadership with disregard of libertarian values and civil rights.
This political conflict echoes divisions within Turkey that historically stem from the
country’s founding secularist principles, but increasingly transcend socio-economic class
and ethno-cultural differences (Gumuscu, 2010). The underlying cultural values are
visible, to some extent, in neighbourhoods and communities which have very distinct
lifestyles (Turam, 2013). In public life, they are signalled among others by women’s
involvement in society and style of dress (Arat, 2010; Vojdik, 2010).
In this context, the present research examines what variables are associated with
support for anti-government protests and support for repression of those protests. It
identifies proximal variables (emotions towards the protests and towards protest
repression and political orientation) and more distal variables (cultural values that are
community-based, see Figure 1). We tested this model in the context of an explosive
political conflict between a conservative government and a sizable progressive opposi-
tion, in a situation where entire communities appear to be taking sides (G€ole, 2013). We
compared it with a closely related alternative model, in which these emotions were
proximate predictors and in which cultural factors are both assumed to be distal
predictors that are uncorrelated.Weexpected the fit of the alternativemodel to be inferior
to the fit of the preferred model.
How Culture Relates to Repression and Protest 53
Choice of variables. We focus on political orientation because prior research showed
that although the protests were initially quite diverse (Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Bilgic &
Kafkaslı, 2013; Konda, 2014), they quickly developed into a conflict between liberals and
conservatives (€Onc€u & Kocan, 2014; Ozkirimli, 2014). The choice of emotions with
regard to the protest and to protest repression (i.e., hate, anger, andmoral condemnation)
was partially based on prior research but also informed by the way the press and social
media legitimized thewidespread (sometimes excessive) use of violence: Protesters were
referred to as traitors and heathens (e.g., Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins, & Schenkkan,
2014; Tastan, 2013, also cf. McLeod & Detenber, 1999; McLeod & Hertog, 1992).
We believe that this political conflict stems from opposing values with regard to the
freedom to make personal choices in life versus traditional community-based values.
Rather than operationalizing this with personal- or national-level values (Caprara et al.,
2008; Vecchione et al., 2015), we operationalized this with the new measure of
community collectivism which we believe meshes well with the grounding of these
conflicts in local tight-knit communities.


















protests and their 
repression 
Figure 1. Twomodels of support for protests and support for repression of protests: theoretical model
(top) and alternative model (bottom).
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Predictions. Regarding proximate variables, we expected support for protest to be
predicted by political progressiveness and negative emotions about government handling
of the protests. Conversely, we expected support for the violent repression of protests to
be predicted by politically conservative views and by negative emotions towards the
protests. Regarding distal predictors, we expected conservative political orientation to be
predicted by more community collectivism, at the level of individual- and community-
based values, and progressive political orientation to be positively correlatedwith agency.
More specifically, we expected collectivism to be positively correlated with a more
conservative political orientation and therefore also with repression, as a consequence of
prioritizing social hierarchy. For agency, we expected the opposite, because of its
expression of personal autonomy.
Method
Participants and procedure
Previous research (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Vecchione et al., 2015) suggests a small-to-
medium relationship among various predictors of collective action, that is, political
orientation, emotional reaction, and cultural values. According to G*power, an a priori
power of .90 can be achieved with 377 participants if a bivariate correlation r = .15 (or
larger). We decided to recruit a slightly larger sample of 500 participants (50% women,
Mage = 34.47) because of concerns we might not attract enough conservatives.
Respondents completed an online questionnaire programmed in Qualtrics. All lived in
Turkey and were recruited from the Qualtrics panel (and compensated by Qualtrics). Six
were identified as multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance, p < .001) and were
replaced by six additional cases by Qualtrics, such that said numbers and proportions
remained intact, that is 500 participants and 50% women. There was an oversampling of
city residents and highly educated respondents. 52% of participants lived in Istanbul,
Ankara, or Izmir although only 30% of the population does. Almost 70% of participants
were highly educated or students, which is above the country average of 10.7% (T€U_IK,
2015). Importantly, a sizeable number of conservatives participated: 38% indicated being
right wing, 45% left wing, and 17% neither left nor right.
Measures
We administered a questionnaire (in Turkish) that measured both CCS and attitudes and
emotions towards the Gezi protests, as well as general (societal) attitudes. In this section,
we will describe the measures relevant for the present study.3
3 The questionnaire was part of a larger study and also included a number of exploratory questions not relevant for the present
study. These were questions about: the communal level of the items (e.g., ‘My community fully supports the Gezi protests’), two
questions to determine religiosity (‘What role does religion play in your life?’) and traditionalism (‘How important is it for you to
lead a life in accordancewith traditional norms and customs?’) on a 0–10 slider, from ‘Not important at all’ to ‘Themost important
thing in life’. Both items were also repeated for their community and the government; a question measuring attitude towards
individual autonomy (‘Do you believe that everyone should be able to make their own choices in life without interference of
others?’); four items concerning attitudes towards the 17–25 December corruption case (e.g., ‘I believe that the corruption
charges were a plot against the government’), on a 5-point scale from ‘fully disagree’ to ‘fully agree’, and repeated for community
and government attitudes; the Subjective Life Satisfaction Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and Psychological
Well-being Scale (Ryff, 1989) to explore whether attitudes were related to general well-being.
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Community collectivism scale. The 30-item community collectivism scale (CCS; Akkus
et al., 2017) is an intersubjective scale of cultural values. CCSmeasures both collectivism
(the mean of the loyalty, hierarchy, and honour subdimensions) and agency. All items are
assessed at the level of the person (towhat extent do the following sentences apply to you
personally) and the community (to what extent do the following sentences apply to your
core family, your extended family, and other families (in your environment) that matter to
you). Thismeans that a personal-level collectivism item such as ‘Iwould supportmy family
members, even if I wouldn’t want to’ is twinned with a community-level item ‘In my
community, people are expected to support their family members, even if they do not
want to’. Similarly, the personal-level agency item ‘I am responsible for the important
choices in my life’ is twinned with ‘In my community, you are responsible for the
important choices in your life’.
Community collectivism scalewas validated in aDutch version andwith inhabitants of
the Netherlands (Akkus et al., 2017) and has been shown to discriminate between
(sub)cultural groups. In the current study, CCSwas translated to Turkish andmaintained a
high reliability: Cronbach’s alpha for the honour subdimension was .88, for loyalty
a = .71, for hierarchy a = .83, and for agency a = .75. We also replicated the factorial
structure4 by means of CFA (using the Lavaan package for R). We therefore conclude that
CCS’s methodological characteristics are stable in this translation and with this sample
from a different country.
Othermeasures. Four items assessed political orientation. Respondents were asked to
indicate their position, on a 10-point bipolar slider, on the dimensions liberal versus
conservative, progressive versus traditional, left versus right, and egalitarian versus
authoritarian. Higher values indicated a stronger endorsement of a conservative,
traditional, right-wing, and authoritarian political orientation. This operationalization of
political orientation was found to be reliable (a = .79), and all four items converged on a
single factor.5
Respondents were asked to answer one item determining opposition or support for
the Gezi protests on a 0–10 slider, from ‘I fully oppose the protests’ to ‘I fully support the
protests’. They were subsequently presented a question measuring support for violent
government repression (‘Do you believe that authorities are entitled to use force and
violence against protests they deem unjust?’), on a 5-point scale, from ‘fully disagree’ to
‘fully agree’.
The respondents were then asked to indicate to what degree they felt six emotions
(anger, grief, anxiety, fear, moral condemnation, and hatred), by responding to the
question ‘what you felt (emotionally) about the protests and responses to it’ followed by
statements, such as ‘I felt angry regarding to the government’s reaction to the protests’
(1 = fully disagree, 5 = fully agree). Finally, we asked for age, gender, education,
birthplace, and residence.
4CFA (using the Lavaan package for R) showed an excellent fit for the one-factor model with CFI = .996, RMSEA = .040, and
SRMR = .015 (with Satorra–Bentler correction).
5 The community-level four-factor model showed a good fit (with Satorra–Bentler correction and corrected for three cross-
loadings), with CFI = .975, RMSEA = .033, and SRMR = .041. For the individual-level model, the fit (with two cross-loadings)
was also acceptable: CFI = .953, RMSEA = .052, and SRMR = .044.
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Analytic strategy
The aim of our study was to examine predictors of support for the Gezi protests and
predictors of support for repression of protests (in general) in one integrated model. We
predicted that both tendencies would be strongly related to proximate predictors
(participants’ political orientation and negative intergroup emotions). These proximate
predictors would, in turn, be predicted by CCS. To test these hypotheses, we performed a
path analysis by means of structural equation modelling (SEM).
Results
Preliminary analyses
As preliminary analysis of the relations among the variables in the model,6 we inspected
the correlations between all variables (Table 1). As expected, conservative political
orientation correlates negativelywith support for theGezi protests andpositivelywith the
endorsement of violent repression. Unsurprisingly, the emotional reactions towards the
Gezi protests and against the violent repression by the government covary as expected
with support for either protest or repression. However, also clear is that the emotions of
anger, moral condemnation, and hate correlate most strongly and consistently with both
outcome variables (consistent with the literature on intergroup emotions, Smith &
Mackie, 2015). In the Supporting Information, we further analyse the separate emotions
and among others show that fear, sadness, and anxiety are more relevant with respect to
support for government repression than for protests.
We then examined the question ofhow these three emotions should be included in the
model. Confirmatory factor analysis assessed a two-factor model predicting that emotions
towards the protests and emotions about their repression loaded on two separate factors.
In this model, the residual variances of the two hate items and of hate and anger towards
the government were allowed to be correlated because this significantly improved fit.
Model fit was excellent, v2(6) = 9.80, p = .13, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .036, and signif-
icantly better than the single-factor equivalent, v2diffð1Þ ¼ 63:99, p < .001. In the final
model, it proved not possible to include these emotions as latent variables, because the
covariance between the negative emotions towards the protest and support for protests
was very high indeed.7 To solve this problem, we ran the final model with the extracted
factor scores for the emotions, instead of with the latent variables themselves.
A final preliminary analysis considered the relation between CCS and action types
(repression vs. protest). In line with expectations, support for the Gezi protests was
negatively correlated with community collectivism and personal collectivism, and
positively with community agency and personal agency. For the support for violent
repression of protests, we see the same pattern of correlations but in the opposite
direction. These results provide a first confirmation of our predictions that community-
based cultural values, as operationalized by CCS, may be closely related to political
affiliation and societal stances.
6We controlled for gender, education, and place of residence and found some correlations and effects in regression analyses.
However, these effects were all mediated by political orientation, emotional reaction, and CCS and were therefore not included in
the integrated model. Traditionalism and religiosity were not included for a similar reason: These variables (which we combined
into one) had such a high degree of covariance with political orientation that they did not contribute significantly to the model. In
view of this and the fact that this protest turned into a political one, we chose to focus on political orientation and drop
traditionalism and religiosity from the integrated model.
7 The covariance table is included in the Supporting Information.
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Path analysis: linking CCS, political orientation, and emotions to support for protests
and repression
On the basis of the preliminary analysis, we tested an integrated model in which both
‘Support for protests’ and ‘Support for violent oppression’ were outcome variables. The
direct predictors were the factor scores of the two latent variables ‘Emotions towards
protests’ and ‘Emotions towards the government response.’ Political orientation was
included in the model as a predictor for support as well as for both emotions. The model
further specifies that emotions and political orientation are predicted by personal
collectivism and personal agency. In the last layer, personal collectivism and personal
agency are predicted by community collectivism and community agency.
As becomes clear from the fitted model (Figure 2), the results are in line with our
expectations: Support for the Gezi protests is positively related to negative emotions
towards government repression, and it is negatively related (and more strongly) to
negative emotions towards the protests. It is also negatively related, albeit to a lesser
degree, to political orientation (i.e., higher degrees of conservatism).
The model results also confirm that the negative emotions, either towards the Gezi
protests or towards the repression of protests, are strongly related to political orientation.
Higher scores on this predictor indicate higher degrees of conservatism, which are
associated with less negative emotions towards government repression and more
negative emotions towards the protests themselves. More interestingly, the emotions are
also predicted by personal collectivism and personal agency, both directly and indirectly,
via political orientation. This confirms our predictions: Political orientation is positively
(and strongly) predicted by personal collectivism and negatively by personal agency.
Table 1. Correlations between support for protests and for repression and various predictors: political





Political orientation .586** .477**
Anger regarding protests .772** .549**
Anger regarding government reaction to protests .661** .527**
Moral condemnation regarding protests .738** .565**
Moral condemnation regarding government
reaction to protests
.620** .454**
Hate regarding protests .539** .410**
Hate regarding government reaction to protests .710** .528**
Sadness regarding protests .465** .286**
Sadness regarding government reaction to protests .599** .548**
Anxiety regarding protests .240** .092*
Anxiety regarding government reaction to protests .537** .452**
Fear regarding protests .265** .111*
Fear regarding government reaction to protests .461** .380**
Community collectivism score .205** .240**
Personal collectivism score .303** .287**
Community agency .120** .003
Personal agency .135** .107*
Note. N: 500; *p < .05; **p < .01; political orientation: Higher values indicate conservatism.
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The fit of the theoretical model was good: CFI = .992, RMSEA = .047, SRMR = .031
with v2(15) = 31.53 (p = .007). The fit of the alternative model in which political
orientation and cultural variables were specified as uncorrelated distal predictors was
inferior, as becomes evident from its goodness-of-fit measures: CFI = .971,
RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .092 with v2(17) = 93.62, p < .001.
In sum, it is clear that there are strong relations between whether people support
protests or their repression, emotions towards these events, and their political
orientation. And in turn there are clear and strong relations between that political
orientation and their (basic) cultural orientation, as expressed with the community
collectivism scale.Wecan therefore conclude that the basic cultural valuesmeasuredwith
CCS help explain which side people might pick in socio-political conflicts between
progressive protesters and a conservative government.
Discussion
What cultural processes underlie political divides that cause tensions within countries
around democratization, women’s rights, and modern libertarian values? Integrating
insights from cross-cultural research, political psychology, and collective action research,
we proposed and found support for a conceptual model that is based on the idea that
people’s support for anti-government protests and support for the government’s
repressive response to these protests are ultimately grounded in cultural values whose
function is to preserve the integrity of local communities. As predicted, the results suggest
that the relationship between community-based values of collectivism and agency is
mediated by proximal predictors: political orientation and emotions with regard to the
conflict. Two things are novel about these findings. One is that it suggests macro-level
Figure 2. Structural equationmodelling path analysis of support for protests and support for repression
of protests; political orientation: Higher values indicate conservatism; N = 500, CFI = .992, RMSEA =
.047, SRMR = .031 with v2(15) = 31.53 ; *p < .05; **p < .01. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonline
library.com]
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political conflict may stem from efforts to maintain or preserve local tight-knit
communities. The second is that the same factors that predict support for protest also
predict support for governmental repression.
We took the Gezi protests in Turkey as an example of a mass protest that divided a
country into those supporting the protests and those supporting its oppression by the
government (Odag, Ulug, & Solak, 2016). Whereas most collective action research has
looked at determinants of (peaceful) societal protest (for overviews see Van Zomeren
et al., 2008; Wright, 2010), we reasoned that the same factors (emotions, political
orientation) might also be related to support for (violent) repression of protests. This is in
linewith previouswork showing that predictors of such societal protests are similar, even
if the nature of the associations may differ, both for parties who would want to challenge
versus defend the status quo (e.g., liberals vs. conservatives, Black vs. White students;
Ayanian&Tausch, 2016; Cakal et al., 2011;Milesi &Alberici, 2018; Osborne et al., 2019).
Indeed, we find that emotions directed respectively at government reactions to protest or
at the anti-government protest and political orientation, liberal versus conservative, were
respectively related to support for societal protest and for its repression. This shows that,
in the context of a political divide between a conservative government and non-
conservative protesters, the same factors that motivate action to achieve social change,
such as people’s political orientation and the emotions they experience, may also explain
support for actions to maintain the status quo.
We also sought to understand what might underlie such emotions and political
affiliations that have the potential to divide a nation. In the case of the tensions within
Turkish society (and potentially others as well), we reasoned that one important factor
maybe that communities in Turkey lead their lives in very differentways and embrace very
different basic cultural values. To capture this, the current researchmeasured community-
based cultural orientations (CCS). Results show that as predicted, CCS is associated with
support for protest as well as repression via political orientation and negative emotions:
Endorsement of collectivist values is associated with conservatism and with negative
emotions towards protests, which in turn is associated with greater support for
repression. Conversely, endorsement of values of personal agency is related to more
liberal political affiliation andmore negative emotions about government actions. And this
in turn is associated with greater support for protest. As predicted by the cultural
collectivism perspective, the research also showed that personal values (of individualism
as well as collectivism) were strongly related to perceived community values. Putting
things together, the statistical model suggests that proximate predictors of support and
opposition of government are related to personal values of collectivism and individualism,
respectively, which in turn are related to community values of collectivism and
individualism. In sum, the findings confirm that cultural values that are specific to local
tight-knit communities are a major source of personal values and thereby may also inform
more macro-level political views.
Theoretical implications
The present work illustrates the value of integrating (cross-)cultural, political, and
collective actionperspectives. At the theoretical level, it indicates that predictors of action
may be similarwhetherwe consider the pursuit of social change or the preservation of the
status quo (cf. Osborne et al., 2019). The fact that these predictors mirror each other
underscores thedynamic nature of political divides: In order to understand the emergence
and consolidation of such divides, research needs to take into account the attitudes of
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bothparties. Being able topredict, bothproximally, via political orientation and emotions,
and distally, via cultural values, towhat extent amore powerful group iswilling to repress
social protest is essential to understanding the mechanisms underlying political divides.
More generally, the present research shows that political divides that can instigate
societal conflicts (e.g., Gezi Park protests; Arab Spring) are thus not only based on power
imbalances and social class per se (cf. Kriesi, 2010; Saeri, Iyer, & Louis, 2015). To illustrate
this with current tensions in the United States: The political divide between supporters of
president Trump and (more liberal) opponents is not only based on social class and a
power imbalance, but also on a fundamental disagreement on values, that are essentially
cultural. Similarly, more right-wing movements striving for change (e.g., PEGIDA in
Germany) seem to be based on cultural rather than political values, on the clash between
modern/liberal and traditionalist/conservative values. Such cultural differences can be
described by means of personal values, such as the Schwartz values, but in many cases,
they may also be anchored in the particular values that people share within their
communities, as described by the CCS. As such, our proposed model provides the means
to understanding political and societal divides from a collective action and cultural value
perspective.
Limitations and future directions
Our model provides the means to unpack the cultural components of social and political
conflict and to look into the contents of the values concerned. The model provides a
template to study the origins of societal and political divides in other societies (e.g., the
United States, Germany, India). However, replication across other political conflicts and
different cultural settings would be of added value. Having said this, we would argue that
the concepts we put forth, cultural values and more proximate determinants (emotions,
political orientation), are likely to predict support for protest versus repression across
cultural contexts. Yet, the relative strengths of these concepts and their subsequent
associations may vary (see also Stewart et al., 2016): For example, in countries that are
more liberal, personal agency and political orientation may be more strongly related than
in the present study.
Also,we note that our analyses are all essentially correlational in nature.While itmakes
sense to consider cultural values as underlying political orientation, emotions, and
political action, more dynamic models are also plausible: For example, engaging in or
witnessing societal protests over time may affect communities and the cultural values
these communities come to hold. In otherwords, cultural values and political orientations
may also be dynamic and subject to change. Future research could speak to this question
by taking a more longitudinal approach in which the dynamics of cultural values and
political action are studied over time. At the same time, in line with the idea of culture as a
sharedmeaning system (Fischer, 2012), it would be of interest to usemulti-level models as
a means of modelling the impact of community level on individual-level values and vice
versa over time (see also Christ, Sibley, & Wagner, 2018).
Conclusion
The present work reveals that in order to understand the positions people take in political
divides, such as supporting societal protest or, conversely, supporting the repression of
such protest, it is important to consider not just individually held political attitudes but
also the local community structure as a possible origin of intra-societal conflict. Both
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support for protest and repression can be related to cultural values that originate in
people’s local tight-knit community, which may inform their political orientations and
emotional responses to political events. As such, the present work contributes to our
understanding of why deep-seated political views are held, maintained, and if necessary
protected.
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